SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: PART 17

----------------------------------------------------------c---------)(
JOSEPH RAKOFSKY, and
RAKOFSKY LAW FIRM, P.C.,
INDE)( NO.: 105573/11
Plaintiffs,
Motion Sequences:
002,004-010 & 014-018

-againstTHE WASHINGTON

POST, et aI.,
DECISION/ORDER
Defendants.

--------------------------------------------------------------------)(
HON. SHLOMO S. HAGLER, J.S.c.:
Motion Practice
In this round of voluminous motion practice comprising fifteen (15) separate motions
and literally thousands of pages served and filed with the court,' fifty-nine (59) defendants move2
for an order pursuant to CPLR

S

321 I (a)(7) and (8), dismissing the amended complaint on the

grounds that the amended complaint fails to state a cause of action and/or the court lacks personal
jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants underCPLR

S 302, New York's

defendants' also move' for an order pursuant to CPLR

S

long-arm statute. Many

8303-a and/or 22 NYCRR

S

130-1.1

I.
This case should be the proverbial poster child for e-filing, or the electronic filing, of
papers to avoid the needless waste of reams of paper to serve. about a dozen attorneys and the
court. E-filing would have been more efficient, and preserved limited judicial resources.
2.
018.

Motion sequence numbers 002, 004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 014, 015, 016, 017 and

3.
Defendants Law Offices of Michael T. Doudna, Michael T. Doudna, The Law Office of
Jeanne O'Halieran, LLC, Jeanne O'Halieran, American Bar Association, abajournal.com, Debra
Cassens Weiss, Sarah Randag, and 35 other defendants represented by both Eric Turkewitz, Esq.
and Marc J. Randazza, Esq.
4.

Motion sequence numbers 007, 010, 019 and 020.

\
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sanctions on plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorney for commencing this allegedly "frivolous" action and
awarding defendants reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiffs Joseph Rakofsky and Rakofsky
\

Law Firm, P.C., ("plaintiffs" or "Rakofsky") cross-move' for an order as follows:
(I) pursuant to CPLR

S

1001 (a); addingWP Company LLC, as a necessary party;

(2) pursuant to CPLR S 3025(b), granting plaintiffs leave to serve and file a Second
Amended Verified Complaint;
(3) pursuant to CPLR SS 3217 and 2101(c), permitting plaintiffs to discontinue this
action against eight defendants6 who have settled with them, and to delete their
names from the caption;
(4) pursuant to CPLR S 3215, granting plaintiffs a default judgment against seven
defendants' on the issue ofliabilityand setting this matter down for an inquest on the
assessment of damages; and
(5) pursuant to 22 NYCRR S 130-1.1, awarding sanctions against Marc J. Randazza,
Esq., "for frivolous conduct undertaken to harass and/or maliciously injure the
plaintiff."
The parties oppose'the respective motions and cross-motions.

The motions and cross-motions are

consolidated herein for disposition.

5.

Motion sequence numbers .008 and 020.

6.
Plaintiffs did not explicitly state the names of said settling defendants for whom plaintiffs
seek to voluntarily discontinue this action; it is insufficient to merely state that they were deleted
from the caption of the amended complaint and have this Court surmise what should be expressly
stated. In addition, it would be advisable and helpful to present executed stipulations of
discontinuance for each defendant.
7.
Again, plaintiffs failed to explicitly list the names of the defaulting defendants, but just
attached the affidavits of service for this Court to surmise their intent. Moreover, this lack of
clarity would not provide the requisite notice to the alleged defaulting defendants that plaintiffs
were seeking default judgments against them.
'

"

-3Procedural History
Plaintiffs commenced this action in Supreme Court, New York County, on or about
May 11,2011 by filing of a summons and complaint. Approximately six (6) days later on May 17,
20 II, plaintiffs fiied an amended complaint as of right against 81 defendants consisting of 218
paragraphs and 82 pages ("Amended Complaint").

The Amended Complaint alleged four causes

of action including one very long defamation claim against all defendants (First Cause of Action),
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Second Cause of Action), intentional
interference with a contract (Third Cause of Action) and violation of Civil Rights Law

S 50 and

51

for improper use of plaintiff's name and picture for purposes of trade (Fourth Cause of Action)
stemming from two articles published in the Washington Post on April I and 9, 2011 ("Washington
Post Articles"), and the subsequent re-publication of the Post Articles. by other defendants and
substantial comments on internet "blogs" that discussed the content of said articles which questioned
plaintiffs' competence and ethics to be discussed later in more detail. Instead of interposing answers,
59 defendants made the instant pre-answer motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint.

Factual Background
Rakofsky's Legal Education & Bar Admission
Rakofsky graduated and received his law degree from the Touro Law Center in 2009.
Since April 29, 2010, Rakofsky has been licensed to practice law in the State of New Jersey. He is
not admitted to practice law in New York State. Rakofsky is engaged in the practice oflaw under
the name of Rakofsky Law Firm, P.C.

,

, -4Rakofsky's Retention in U.S.A. v Dontrell Deaner
In or about May3, 2010, Henrietta Watson initially retained plaintiffs to defend her
grandson, Dontrell Deaner ("Deaner"), who was charged, among other crimes, with First Degree
Murder in Washington. D.C.

Thereafter, Rakofsky met with Deaner who retained plaintiffs to'

represent him in the upcoming trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

Since

Rakofsky was not licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia, he sought and obtained
admission pro hac vice. Rakofsky brought in local counsel, Sherlock Grigsby, Esq. ("Grigsby"),
who had substantial experience in criminal defense work, to assist him in Deaner's defense .
. However, Rakofsky alleges that he was primary and responsible attorney that developed and

i
executed the legal strategy in the case.

Bean's Retention and Termination as Defense Investigator
Rakofsky and/or Grigsb~ also retained Adriari K. Bean ("Bean"), a certified
investigator under the CriminaiJustice

Act Defender Service of the Superior Court ("CJA") as the

defense investigator in the Deaner case. As part of his investigative duties, on October 6,.2010,
Rakofsky e-mailed Bean, in pertinent part, the following request:
I) Please trick8Leigh' (old lady) into admitting:
a) she told the 2 lawyers that she did not see the shooting and
b) she told 2 lawyers she did not provide the Government any
information about [the] shooting.

8.
The definition of trick, in part, is to "deceive" or "practice deception."
New Twentieth Century Dictionary Unabridged, Second Edition, 1964).

(See Webster's

9.
Her name was blacked out in motion sequence number 008, but was revealed later in
motion sequence 010.

-5(See Motion Sequence Number 008, Exhibit "E" to the Affidavit of Keith 1. Alexander, sworn to
,

.i

.

on July 15,2011.)
Later, Rakofsky and/or Grigsby terminated Bean's services and replaced. him with
another investigator. By letter dated March 5, 2011, Bean sent Grigsby an invoice for investigative
services he rendered in the Deaner case. (See Exhibit "E" to Motion Sequence Number 009.)
. Rakofsky alleges that Bean did not perform any investigative services and he refused to approve
Bean's voucher for payment from the CJA. A~ a result, Bean made a motion to the Superior Co,urt
of the District of Columbia requesting compensation for about 22 hours of investigative services and
payment through a CJA voucher. Belin concluded that he was terminated and uncompensated for
his work "based on his refusal to follow an e-mailrequest
try to 'trick'

a witness into changing her testimony."

from Mr. Rakofsky ...instructing him to
(Id.)

On page four of the attached

"Investigative Report," Bean stated in bold lettering several reasons for his refusal to perform
Rakofsky's e-mail request as follows:
,

(1) I do not know what the term, 'trick', means in this context;
(2) I am in the investigative business, not the trickery business;
(3) I will not risk exposing myself to obstruction of justice or conspiracy charges; and
(4) the implications of such a request appear to [be] inherently unethical. .
(Id.)

The Trial
A day before jury selection, on March 28, 2011, the prosecution moved to suppress
a Toxicology Report that Rakofsky intended to use which he alleged evidenced that the victim was
"high on PCP at the time of his death." (See Amended Complaint at ~ 100.) The presiding judge,
William M: Jackson ("Judge Jackson") granted the prosecution's motion and prohibited Rakofsky

.,,

,

,
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from mentioning and introducing any evidence that the victim was under the influence of PCP at the
time of his death. (Id.)
Thereafter, on March 30, 2011, the trial began. In his hour-long opening statement,
Rakofsky repeatedly sought to mention the Toxicology Report rationalizing that only references to
\

PCP were prohibited and not the actual report. (Id. at -,]102.) Judge Jackson admonished Rakofsky
)

for violating his prior ruling. (Id.) At the end of his ~pening statement, Rakofsky told the jury that
he never tried a case before. so that Deaner should not be prejudiced for his errors ..
Due to this revelation, after the conclusion of opening statements, Judge Jackson
conducted a side-bar discussion with Deaner to ascertain whether he was satisfied and comfortable
with Rakofsky continuing as his attorney even though it was his'first trial. (ld. at -,]1012.) Deaner
responded affirmatively.
.

The trial then continued.
I

The next morning, March 31, 2011, Judge
._

,

Jackson again questioned Deaner ifhe was satisfied with Rakofsky's level of experience. Despite
his inexperience, Deaner wanted Rakofsky to represent him. (Id.)
During the testimony of a prosecution witness on March 31, 20 II,'Deaner passed
Rakofsky certain questions that he wanted Rakofsky to ask the witness.

Rakofsky refused to ask

those questions because he believed it would not be in Deaner's best interests. (ld. at -,]108.) Later
,

,

.

.

in the afternoon, Rakofsky and Grigsby approached Judge Jackson and explained there was a
"communication barrier" between'them and Deaner. (See Exhibit "B" to Motion Sequence 010 at
p. 2,) Judge Jackson suggested thatthey should take some time to explain to Deaner their reasoning
for not asking his questions. Rakofsky then replied to Judge Jackson that "it might be a good time
for you to excuse me from trying this case." (ld. at p. 3.) At that point, Judge Jackson inquired of
, Deaner who now requested ne:-vcounsel. Judge Jackson then explained to Deaner the ramifications
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of a mistrial and adjourned th,etrial to the next morning, April 1,2011, to give Deaner an opportunity
to fully contemplate his request, as follows:
"This is what I'm going to do, Mr. Deaner, I'm inclined to grant your request, but r
want you to think about it overnight. We'll come back here tomorrow morning. You
can get somebody to stand in for you, if you wish."

-

(Id. at p. 12.)

The parties returned the next morning. Judge Jackson asked Deaner if he had an
opportunity to think about his request and ifhe wanted new counsel. Deaner requested new counsel.
(See Exhibit "C" to Motion Sequence 010 at p. 3.) Judge Jackson then summarized the events that
precipitated Deaner's request as follows:
"Mr. Rakofsky actually asked to withdraw mid-trial ... and according to Mr. Deaner,
there was conflict as well between local counsel, Mr. Grigsby's legal advice and
Mr. Rakofsky's iegal advice."
. (Id.)
Judge Jackson then reiterated on the record his two previous side-bars with Deaner
wherein he asked the defendant if he was satisfied with Rakofsy's level of experience.

Judge

Jackson then made his own candid observations concerning Rakofsky's trial performance and
competency to defend Deaner in the felony murder case as follows:

.

-

"r was' astonished that someone would purport to represent someone in a felony
murder case who had never tried a case before and that local counsel, Mr. Grigsby,
was complicit in this.
"It appeared to the Court that there were. : . defense theories out there, but [Rakofsky
had] the inability to execute those theories. It was apparent to the Court that there
was ... not a good grasp of legal principles and legal procedure of what was
admissible and what was not admissible that inured, r think, to the detriment ofMr.
Deaner."
(Id. at p. 4.)

-8Based on the above observations, Judge Jackson revealed that he would have set aside_
Deaner's c~mviction based on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel under D.C. Code

S 23-11 0

(1996) as follows:
..

'~

"And had there been ... a conviction in this case, based on what I had seen so far
I would have granted a motion for a ~ew trial under 23.110.'"
-,'
(Id.)

,
Judge Jackson then granted Deaner's request for new counsel and stated an alternate

reason for his ruling:
"So I am going to grant Mr. Deaner's request for new counsel. ... Alternatively,I
would findthat they are based on my observation of the conduct of the trial manifest
necessity. I believe that the performance was below what any reasonable person
would expect in a murder trial."
(Id. at p. 4-5.)
In addition to the observations concerning Rakofsky'scompetency,

Judge Jackson

also commented on Bean's motion alleging that he was terminated and uncompensated based on
-,
Bean's refusal to comply with Rakofsky's

e-mail request to "trick" a witness which Bean

characterized as "inherently unethical":
"There's an e-mail from you to the investigator [Bean] that you may want to look at,
Mr. Rakofsky. It raises ethical issues."
(/d. at p. 7.)

The Washington Post April 1, 2011 Article
That same day on April I, 2011, The Washington Post published on its website an
article entitled D. C. Superior Court Judge Declares Mistrial Over Attorney's Competence in Murder
Case, which was authored by its reporter Keith L. Alexander ("Alexander"), witl}assistance from
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researcher Jennifer Jenkins ("Jenkins"), reporting the mistrial in the'Deaner

case

("April 1st

Article"). (See Motion Sequence 008, Exhibit "B" to the Patil Affirmation dated July 20, 2011.)
The article was re-published i~ the Metro s~ctionofthe

Washington Post newspaper on April 2,

2011, under a different headline, Mistrial Declared in '08 D.C. Case. The article reported Judge
Jackson's comments relating to Rakofsky's' competence and ethical issues that surfaced through.
Bean's motion for compensation.

The American Bar Association and Reuters April 4, 2011 Articles
Based on the previously reported April I st Article, the American Bar Association
("ABA") published on its website,abajoumal.com,

an article entitled 'Astonished' Judge Declares

Murder Mistrial Due to Defense Lawyer Who Never Tried a Case, authored by Debra Cassens Weiss
,

("Weiss") on April 4, 2011 (See Motion Sequence 018, Exhibit ".1" to the Weiss Affidavit, sworn
to on March 29, 2012). The same day, Reuters America, LLC, through its subsidiary, Thomson
Reuters Corp. ,also published a short article on its website called Young and Unethicalwj-itten by
its reporter, Daniel B. Slater ("Slater") (See Exhibit "0" to Motion Sequence 006).'
, Both articles
reported that Judge Jackson declared a mistrial due to Rakofsky' s performance and Bean's allegation
th~t Rakofsky requested the investigator to "trick a witness," citing to The Washington Post's April
I st Article.

Reaction to the Mistrial Proliferates on the Internet
After the April I st Article, many "bloggers" posted online comments and articles on

.
their legal blogs depicting the Deaner mistrial as an "object lesson" for those unsuspecting clients
that contemplate retention of inexperienced defense counsel in criminal cases based on low cost and

'

-10-

exaggerated marketing. Reaction to the Deaner mistrial was swift and furious. The legal bloggers
expressed their strongly-worded opinions as to Rakofsky's acknowledged inexperience in defending
Deaner and the "ethical issues" raised by his e-mail requesting that Bean "trick" a witness. Many
of these legal bloggers were named as defendants in this action.

The American Bar Association April 8,2011 ArtiCle
With the on,going proliferation of commentary on the internet, the ABA published
on its website, on April 8, 2011, an article calledAround the Blawgosphere: Joseph Rakofsky Sound
Off; Client Poachers; and the End of Blawg Review? authored by its web editor Sarah Randag
("Randag"), summarizing published web po stings from "several well-known legal blogs" concerning
the.controversy that surrounded Rakofsky. (See Motion Sequence 008, Exhibit" I" through Exhibit
"IS" to the Randag Affidavit, sworn to on March 29, 2012, at'1[3.) Randag included an article
.

".

published on the ABA website on AprilS,

.

I

•

2011, written by Weiss, reporting that Rakofsky

"appeared to be pleased in a Facebook post after ... [Judge Jackson] declared a mistrial due to the
defense lawYer's t,rial performance," but Rakofsky was later "humiliated by a press account of the
proceeding."

(ld. at Exhibit "3".)

The Washington Post April
9, 2011 ArtiCle
,
Alexander then wrote a follow-up article entitled Woman Pays $7, 700 to Grandson's
Attorney Who Was Later Removedfor Inexperience which was published on The Washington Post
website on April 9, 20 II. (See Motion Sequence 008, Exhibit "C" to the Patil Affirmation dated July
20,2011.)

The article was re-published in the Metro section of The Washington Post newspaper on

April 10,2011, under the headline, Attor~ey 's1nexpetience Gives Grandmother $7, 700 Headache.

!

-11-

This arti'c1e described how Rakofsky allegedly solicited Deaner's grandmother to retain him to
.

,

represent her grandson and reported that Judge Jackson "dismissed Rakofsky from the case and
declared a mistrial, citing the lawyer's lack of competence."

(Id.)

Plaintiffs'. Motion for Leave to Amend
Plaintiffs seek leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to add causes of action for
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, injurious falsehood, negligence, and .
prima facie
tort in the form of"cyber-bullying
or mobbing"
as well as to ...
make stylistic changes'O such
.'
. .
,
as to articulate separate causes against each named defendant instead of one cause of action for each
theory of liability. In the Second Amended Complaint; plaintiffs reduce the number of defendants
from 81 to 74, but they vastly increase the sheer bulk of the complaint to more than 1,200 paragraphs
and almost 300 pages.
It is well settled lawthat "leave to amend pleadings is to be freely given, absent a

,

showing of prejudice or surprise." (BriarpatchLtd,
.

L.P. v BriarpatchFilm

Corp., 60 AD3d 585, 585

[I st Dept 2009].) Nevertheless, an examination of the underlying merit of the proposed amendment
is required, and "leave will be denied where the proposed pleading fails to state a claim or is palpably
insufficient as a matter oflaw."

(Thompson v Cooper, 24 AD3d 203, 205 [I st Dept 2005].)

Here, there is neither a showing by the defendants of prejudice nor surprise resulting
from plaintiffs' delay in asserting their new causes of action. However, granting plaintiffs' motion
to amend would be futile sinc~ the allegations set forth in the proposed Second Amended C;:omplaint

10.
Except for the new causes of action, it appears that the substantive allegations in both
pleadings are similar.
'
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.

. are not sufficient to state a cause of action; as will be discussed below in defendants' motions to
.
~
-

dismiss.
Motion to Dismiss
!n determining a motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to siate a cause of action, the
court must "accept the facts as alleged in the Complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the-benefit of every
possible favorable. Inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit into any cognizable

.

..

legal theory." (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see also Nonnon v City a/New York,
9 NY3d 825 [2007].) In a defamation action, the court must determine if the alleged defamatory .
statements are not actionable as a matter of law. (Steinhilber v Alphonse, 68 NY2d 283 [1986].)
Here, defendants seek dismissal of the amended complaint' as it fails to state a cause .
of action and/or the court lacks personal jprisdiction over the out-of-state defendants.

Loitg~ArmJurisdiction
Many defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that the court
lacks personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants under CPLR

9 302, New

York's long-arm

statute.
Constitutional due process requires that' a court have a basis on which to assert its

,

. jurisdiction.

Traditionally,

.

geographical jurisdiction.

this basis was supplied by the party's presence .within the court's
.

However, the advent of a more mobile soc'iety and the growth of national

markets has made it possible for a substantial volume of business to be transacted within a state
without a party ever entering into th'lt'state. Recognizing this, the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded
the permissible powers of states to obtain personal jurisdiction over non-residents. In International
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Shoe v Washington (326 US 310 [1945]), the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the standard for
determining whether a non-resident may be subjected to the jurisdiction of a state's courts as follows:
"Due process requires o~ly that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
.personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions offair play and substantial justice."

I

(Id. at 316.)

!
In a series of decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has further detailed the essential

considerations to be weighed in determining whether a court had personal jurisdiction

over an

out-of-state defendant\ The Court has held that as long as'a party has purposely availed itself of the
benefits of the forum, has sufficient minimum contacts with it and should reasonably expect to defend
its actions there, due process is not offended if that party is subjected to jurisdiction even if not
physically present in that state. (See McGee v International Life Ins. Co., 355 US 220 [1957]; World
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v Woodson, 444 US 286 [1980].)
New York's Long Arm Statute, CPLR

S 302, governs

personal jurisdiction over a non-

. domiciliary who either "transacts any business" or "commits a tortious act" within the slate. There
is an express exception carved out for defamation cases which cannot form the basis to obtain
jurisdiction through the commission of a tortious act under CPLR

S 302(a)(2)

and (3) .. However, a

plaintiff in a defamation case may proceed against a non-domiciliary defendant who "transacts any
business" under CPLR

S 302(a)(l)

.. Defamation cases are treated differently "to reflect the state's

policy of preventing disproportionate restrictions on freed<;,mof expression" (SPCA of Upstate New.
York, Inc. v American Working Collie Assn., 18 NY3d 400, 404 [2012] [citations omitted]).
Court of Appeals further expounded on these policy concerns as follows:

The
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"The Legislature has manifested its intention to treat the tort of defamation differently
from other causes of action and we believe that, as a result, particular care must be
taken to make certain that non-domiciliaries are not haled into court in a manner that
potentially chills free speech without an appropriate showing that they purposefully
transacted business here and the proper nexus exists between the transaction and the
defamatory statements at issue."
,
.
,

,

(Id. at 405-406).
Generally, so long as the defendant's activities in the State of New York we~e
"purposeful" and there is a "nexus" or "substantial relationship" between the transaction and the
)

claim asserted, jurisdiction will be invoked for transacting business underCPLR

S 302(a)(I).

(Id. at

404.) Thus, this Court needs to examine what type of purposeful activities the defendants engaged.
in here that bears a substantial relationship to the alleged defamatory statements.'

An added

consideration is how to construe the transaction of business on the internet as it relates to defamation
cases.
One particular federal court examined the issue oflong-arm jurisdiction as it rdates
to conducting business on the internet and concluded that personal jurisdiction is exercised in direct
. proportion to "the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts on the Internet."
(Zippo MIg. CO. v Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F Supp 1119, 1124 [W.D. PA 1997].) It reviewed the
/

applicable cases and developed a "sliding scak" to measure the commercial activity, which has been
widely'quoted and accepted.

(Id.) However, the Second Circuit lias limited its applicability in

defamation cases as "to whether the defendant, through the website, purposefully avail[ ed] himself
of the privilege of conducting activities within New York, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws." (Best Van Lines, Inc. v Walker, 490 F3d 239, 252 [2d Cir. 2007] [citations omitted].)
In other words, it is insufficient to gauge the overall commercial activity of the d~fendant on its
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f

website alone, without determining whether such purposeful activities in this state were substantially
related to the alleged defamatory statements. (SPCA, 18 NY3d at 405-406.).
It is quite clear that defendants" herein who operated legal blogs or posted comments'
on those blogs residing out of the country in Canada, or ev~n in the United States ranging from
,
Washington, D.C. and Florida in the east, to Texas and California in the west, had virtually no
purposeful activitY or minimum contacts with this state. There was certainly no purposeful activities
in this state which were substantially related to the alleged defamatory statements as defendants
neither wrote the alleged defamatory statements in this state nor did they direct them to our state
alone. The statements were posted on the internet with potential world-wide accessibility.
This Court rejects plaintiffs' primary argument in opposition that defendants received
"commercial benefits" from the hyper-links contained in their websites to invoke long-arm
jurisdiction. This connection to New York, if any, is too attenuated to exercise personal jurisdiction
over the out-of state defendants. Pl~inly stated, there are insufficient contacts with this state to "hale"
into court multiple defendants living thousands of miles away in other states which would "chill" their
right to free speech. (SPCA, 18 NY 3d at 405.)

Standard for Defamation Action
To establish a cause of action for defamation, plaintiffs must demonstrate the
following elements:
I) a false statement on the 'part of the defendants concerning the plaintiffs;
'>

.

2) published without privilege or authorization to a third party;

II.
This argument does not apply to defendants The Washington Post and Reuters who have
not argued that they do not transact business in this state.
.

-163) with the requisite level of fault on the part ofthe defendants; and
4) causing damage to plaintiffs' reputation by specia1'harm or defamation per se
,:
(See Restatement [Second] of Torts S 558;' Dillon v City a/New York, 261 AD2d 34, 38 [1st Dept
1999].)
CPLR

S 30 16(a) requires that the alleged false and defamatory
I

particularity in the complaint.

words be specified with

~

The complaint must also allege the "time, place and manner of the

false statement and to specifY to whom it was made." (Dillon, 251 AD2d at 38 [citations omitted].)
Plaintiffs set forth many statements published by the defendants in print and an on-line
. that they allege are false and defamatory which can be isolated into two discrete categories:
(I)

Defendants' alleged mis-characterization of Rakofsky's e-mail request to
"trick" a witness and Bean's subsequent motion which Judge Jackson stated
raised "ethical issues" ("the trick e~mail, the Bean Motion and Judge Jackson's
comments"); and

(2)

Defendants' incorrectly'reported that Judge Jackson declared a mistrial due to
Rakofsky's competence or inexperience ("no mistrial due to incompetence").

(Amended Complaint at ~~ 129-194).
Defendants challenge the sufficiency of these pleadings based on the "fair report"
privilege, the "rep~blication"

exception and/or that the' alleged defamatory statements are non-

actionable as expressions of pure opinion which will be discussed below.

, Fair Report Privilege
Defendants assert that the "fair report" privilege bars plaintiffs' defamation
claims
,
,

under the Civil Rights Law

S

74. With the enactment of the.Civil Rights Law

S

74 in 1962, the

Legislature created a statutory privilege that prohibits, in relevant part, the maintenance of a civil
action including defamation and other related claims based

an the publication

of a "fair and true
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report" of any judicial proceeding.

The apparent purpose of the privilege is to promote the dual
,

public policy interest of ensuring the free flow of true informatio~ without fear of being sued, and
.

,

'

public dissemination of judicial decisions and proceedings .for proper administration

of justice.

(Beary v West Publishing Co., 763 F2d 66 [2nd Cir] cert denied 474 US 903 [1985].)
This privilege has been liberally interpreted to provide broad protection for news
reports of judicial proceedi~gs. (ljoly Spirit Assn. for the Unification of World Christianity v New,
York Times Co., 49 NY2'd 63 [1979].) In view of the above purpose and the liberal interpretation,
courts have established the meaning of a"fair and true" report as a substantially accurate report. (ld.

,

at 67, quoting Briarcliff Lodge Hotel, Inc. v Citizen-Sentinel Pubis., 260 NY 106, 118' [1932].)
In contrast, courts have rejected the notion that a news report be tested for literal accuracy because
the language should not be "dissected and analyzed with a lexicographer's
at 68.)

precision."

(Holy Spirit

The standard must comport with substantial as opposed to literal accuracy because a

"newspaper article [or'oil-line report] is, by its very nature, a condensed of events y,rhichmust, of
necessity, refle6t to soine degree the subjective viewpoint of its author." (ld.). Even the failure to
report other facts that were favorable to the complainant in the published news report constitutes a
fair report where "those omissions did not al~er the substantially acc,urate character bfthe article."
(McDonald v East Hampton Star, lOAD 3d 639,640 [2d Dept 2004].) In summary, the courts must
look for substantial and contextual accuracy of the news report as the standard for determining a 'fair
report under the.Civil Rights Law

S 74.

In this case, plaintiffs'

Amended Complaint

Complaint are replete with hyper-technicaJ

and proposed

allegations that defendants

misquoted" various statements of Rakofsky, Bean and Judge Jackson.

Second Amended

"misrepresented

and

(Amended Coinplaint at

-18-

.

~ 132.) Rather than wading.through the hundreds of alleged defamatory statements, this Court will
analyze the statements
through two general categories: (I) the trick e-mail, the Bean motion
and
,
.
.'

Judge Jackson's comments, and (2) whether the mistrial was due to incoinpetence .
. A comparison of the initial Washington Post Articles and the subsequent news reports
and comments, and Rakofsky'.s e-mail' to Bean requesting that he "trick" a witness, Bean's later
motion filed' in ~court to obtain compensation for his investigative services and Judge Jackson's
comment that the same raises "ethical issues," reveals that they are a substantially and contextually
accurate report. While the precise words are not exactly identical, they are similar enough to convey
.a fair.report of the Rakofsky e-mail and the Bean moti9n that were inextricably intertwined with the
judicial proceedings before Judge Jackson in the Deaner case. Even though the "trick" e-mail, the
Bean motion and Judge Jackson's

comments do not portray Rakofskyin

a positive light, and

Rakofsky may wish to disavow or interpret them if!.a different way, the defendants were permitted .
to publicly disseminate them as a report of a judicial proceeding.
The second category encompasses the many alleged defamatory statements that Judge
Jackson declared a mistrial due to Rako'fsky' s competence or inexperience. Rakofsky does not deny
Judge Jackson made several comments that he was not competent and too inexperienced to provide
a proper defense to Deaner in a: murder trial.' In fact, during the trial, Judge Jackson had two side-bar
discussions' with Deaner pointedly inquiring whether he was satisfied with Rakofsky's competence
and lack of trial experience. The gravamen of Rakofsky's argument is that there was no causal.
connection between the mistrial.and his competence and inexperience.

Rather, Rakofsky contends

that Judge Jackson declared a mistrial based on Rakofsky's own application due to a conflict between.
him and Deaner.
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.Rakofsky may be correct that on March 31, 2011 ,he made the initial application to

I "

.

.

Judge Jackson to withdraw as Deaner;s counsel. However, at that point, Judge Jackson inquired:of
Deaner, and Deaner then request~d new counsel.

Judge Jackson adjourned,the

morning, April'i, 2011, to follow-up onDeaner'srequest

trial to the next

for new counsel. On Aprill, 20ll,Judge

Jackson granted Deaner's request for new counsel after making considerable comments concerning
Rakofsky's competence and lack oftiial experiepce. You can not look at Judge Jackson's comments
in isolation, but incontext considering'all of his comments and Rakofsky's
trial performance.
,

The

clear import of Judge Jackson's rulings was to excuSe Rakofsky due to his lack of competence and
.

.

.

-'!.

inexperience to defend Deaner in a murder trial. It is acknowledged that the Deaner murder trial was
\

,

-

.'

I

Rakofsky's first trial in a foreign jurisdiCtion and with which he was totally unfamiliar, and Judge
,

.'

",

,

-

Jackson was vigilant in protecting Deaner's right to effective assistange of counsel.

~ignificantly, the report,ed fact that Judge Jackson declared a mistrial in the Deaner
case was (lot'defamatory
development in his career.

because even Rakofsky initially celebrated the mistrial. a~ a positive
In other words, defendants' report that a mistriitl occurred
does not
.
.
;

constitute defamation. Instead, the reported statements that Rakofsky was allegedly not co~pete'nt,
inexperienced and unethical are the operative words which may give rise to defamation, 'e~ceptthat ..
j,

said content was privileged under the Civil Right Law

S 74,

Republication Exception
Some defendants also assert that plaintiffs' defamation claimS are barred by' the
. "republication" exception or otherwise known as the "wire service defense.'.' It is well settled that a
republisher may
rely on the research
.
'. ofthe original publisher, "abs,ent a showing that the republisher

-20'had, or should have had, substantial reasons to question the accuracy ofthe articles or the bo~afides
of [the] reporter.' " (Karaduman v Newsday, Inc., 51 NY2d 530, 550 [1980], quoting Rinaldi v Holt,
,
.. Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 383 [1971].) This exception applies where one news agency

,

republishes the content of a news story that was originally published by another reputable news
agency or source. (Zetes v Richman, 86 AD2d 746 (4th Dept 1982] [defendant was immune from
liability for republishing

story originally

published

by United

Press International];

Rust

Communications Group, Inc. v 70 State St. Travel Serv., 122 AD2d 584 [4th Dept 1986].)
In this case, many defendants'republished

direct quotes or summarized the content of

,
. articles thaI were originally published .by The Washington Post on April 1st and 9th, 201 J. These
.

defendants were entitled to rely upon the research and reporting of The Washington Post, a reputable
n'ews agency, which was clearly a substantially accurate report as stated above, in their republication.
To the extent that defendants republished content from The W'ashington Post Articles, plaintiffs,'
claims for defamation are barred by the "republication" exception,

Expressions of Pure Opinion
To the extent the defendants are not covered. by the fair report privilege or the
republication exception, defendants assert that the statements complained of are non-actionable as
expressio~s of pure opinion.
About two years ago, the Appellate Division, First Department (Saxe, J.) wrote a
scholarly decision anaJyzing whether certain comments posted on the internet were actionable as
defamatory fay~ual statements or just pure opinion.

(Sandals Resorts Inti., Ltd., v G,oogle, Inc.,

86 AD3d 32 [1st Dept 2011] [on-line e-mail posting that impliedly accused the owners ofa Jamaican

i,

I '

-21resart .of racism was nan-actianable apinian ].) The FirstDepartnient

explained that defamatian must

be premised an
, p'ublished assertians .affact rather than an assertians .of apinian. (Id., at 38.) In the
leading case .of Steinhilber v Alphonse (68 NY2d 283 [1986]);the Caurt .of Appeals articulated the

,

standard far distinguishing between fact and apinian as fallaws:
,,"A 'pure apinian' is a statement .of apinian which is accampanied by a recitatian .of
the facts upan which iUs based. An apinian nat accampanied by such a factual
recitatianmay, nevertheless, .be 'pure apinian'ifit daes nat imply that iUs based
upan
.
.an undisclased fact. When, hawever, the statement .of apinian implies that it is based
upan facts which justifY the apinian but are unknawn ta those reading .or hearing it,
it is a 'mixed apinian' and is actianable. The actianable element afa 'mixed apinian'
is nat the false apinian .itself - it is the implicatian that the speaker knaws certain
facts, unknawn ta his audience, which support his apinian and are detrimental ta the
persan abaut wham he is speaking."
(Id. at 289-290 [citatians and faatnate .omitted].)

Based an lang-standing precedent, the First Department emphasized that the caurt

.

needs ta examine the entirety .of the wards, including its tane and purpase,
as well as the "broader
.
sacial cantext" ta determine whether the cantent .of the published statement canstitutes defamatian.
(Sandals, 86 AD3d at 41.) The "braader sacial c'antext" is .one .of ~our factars enunciated !:lythe
federal caurts ta distinguish between protected apinians and unprotected factual assertians. (OUman
v Evans, 750 F2d 970 (DC Cir 1984), cert denied 471 US.1127 [1985].).
This determinatian is quite a camplex balancing act as "even apparent statements .of
fact may assume the character .of statements .of apinian, and thus privileged, when made in public
.

.

.

debate, heated labar disputes, or ather circumstances in which the audience may anticipate [the use]

.
.of epithets, fiery rhetaric .or hyperb.ole." (Steinhilber, 68 NY2d at 294 [citatians .omitted].) With this

in mind, the proper inquiry is, "whether the reasanable reader wauld have believed that the challenged
statements, were. canveying facts abatit the ... plaintifC'

(Sandals,
86 AD3d at 42, quating Brian v
..

-22Richardson, 87 NY2d 46,51 [1995], which quoted Immuno AG v Moor~Jankowski, 77 NY2d 235,
254 [1986].)
The Appellate Division seemed to make a distinction between traditional print outlets
and on-line posts and e-mails when considering the "broader social context" of the communications.
It stated that "[t]he culture oflnternet communications, as distinct from that of print media such as
newspapers and magazines, has been characterized as encouraging a " 'freewheel;~g, anything goes
writing style.' " (Sandals, 86 AD3d at 43 [citations omitted].). The Appellate Division observed that
readers give less credence to allegedly defamatory comments published on the Internet, as well in email posts or blogs, than in other contexts. (ld at 44.) It concluded that "the anonymity of the e-mail
makes it mOre likely that a reasonable reader would view its assertions with some skepticism and tend
to treat its contents as opinion rather than as fact." (ld)
In this case, a review of the complained of statements show that they are nonactionab!e opinions. This Court did not view the words in isolation, but considered the entirety of
the communications which contained references to the Washington Post Articles or contained hyp~r- .
links to them. These references and hyper-links provide sufficient basis for the reader to understand
the facts upon which they were based.
The hostile tone of the complained statements indicates that the writer was expressing
his or her strongly-held personal view as to whether Rakofsky: as a newly minted lawyer who may
have ma~keted himself as an experienced litigator, was justified in representing Deaner as lead'
. counsel in a murder trial without any trial experience, and .terminating the investigator without
compensation as a result of his refusal to comply with Rakofsky's alleged instruction to "trick" a
witness at trial which Judge Jackson stated raised "ethical concerns."

The purpose of the on-line,

I
-i

-23-

posts was to engage readers in open and unfettered critical discussion of ideas and to express opinions
on those topics.
When viewed from the broader social context, it is readily apparent that the on-line
commentary and posts "on legal blogs discussing Rakofsky were exchanges of opinions between
criminal defense lawyers and other individuals who were concerned that Deaner was denied the
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel for his defense that has been the hallmark of our
criminal justice system for more than fifty years. (See Gideon v Wainright, 372 US 335 [1963].) It
was essentially a public debate on the internet with on-line users posting their partially anonymous
statements In response to the Washington Post Articles and later articles and commentary featured
on the legal blogs.
"

12

The average reader would view its assertions with some reservations, as did a

-

,

minority of commentators who defended Rakofsky's actions, and treat its contents as mere opinion
rather than as a"statement of fact.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants' false statements subjected him to public ridicule.

In order to protect our prized First Amendment rights to free speech and press as well as debate on
public issues, courts have insulated defendants from liability for stating o"pinions that an?ther person
was "immoral" and "unethical" (Hollander v Cayton, 145 AD 2d 605, 606 [2d Dept 1988]), and for
"lying, deceiving, [and] making false promises" (Epstein v Board of Trustees of Dowling College,
152 AD 2d 534, 535 [2d Dept] 989]). Plaintiffs may not recover from defendants for expressing their
opinions of Rakofsky' s performance on the Deaner case no matter how unreasonable or erroneous_

12.
Defendants Banned Ventures LLC and Bannination, who are online service providers
operating essentially a message or virtual bulletin board, are also immune 'from liability for the
statements made by "tarrant84" on their website under the Communications Decency Act,
codified at 47 USC S 230. (See Shiamili.v The Real Estate Group of New York, Inc., 17 NY3d
281 [2011].)
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Rakofsky believes them to be. (See New York Times Co..v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 271-272 [1964];
Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY 2d at 380-381.)

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiffs asserted a second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
.. distress premised on the same facts underpinning the defamation claims. In order to prove such a
cause of action, plaintiffs must demonstrate the following elements:
(I)

. (ii)

extreme and outrageous conduct;
intent to cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing
severe emotional distress;

(iii)

a causal connection between the conduct and injury; and

(iv)

severe emotional distress.

.(

(Howell v New York Post Co., Inc., 81 NY2d 115, 121 [1993]; Restatement [Second] ofTorts

S 46.)

In this case, the Amended Complaint and proposed Second Amended Complaint fail
to state a cause of action as to the elements stated above. Specifically, the pleadings falls short of the
extreme an<!outrageous conduct required to substantiate plaintiffs' claims. (See Freihofer v Hearst
Corp., 65 NY2d 135 [1985].)

In addition, plaintiffs can not recover for intentional infliction of

emotional distreSs caused by duplicative claims of defamation alleged in the pleadings. (Manno v
Hembrooke, 120 AD2d818,

820 [3d Dept 1986]; Levin v McPhee, 917 F Supp 230, 242 [SDNY

1996], affd 119 F3d 189 [2d Cir 1997].) This conclusion is based on the well settled law that '" a
cause of action fot intentional infliction of emotional distress .should not be entertained 'where the
conduct complained of falls well within the ambit of other traditional tort liability.' " Butler v
Delaware Otsego Corp., 203 AD2d 783,784 [3d Dept 1994] [citations omitted].)

,

-25Intentional Interference With Contract
Plaintiffs asserted a third cause of action for intentional interfere 'nee with contract.
based again on the same facts underpinning the defamation claims. To establish such a cause of
,

action, plaintiffs must demonstrate the following elements:
(i)

a valid contract exists;

(ii)

a third party had knowledge of the contract;

(iii)

that third party intentionally procured the breach of the contract; and

(iv)

caused damage to plaintiffs.

(Israel v Wood Dolson Co., 1 NY2d116,

120 [1956]; Haag v Chancellor, Inc., 246 AD2d 224, 228

)

[lstDept

1998].)
In this case, the Amended Complaint a~d proposed Second Amended Complaint fail

to state a cause of action as to the elemerits stated above. Specifically, the plaintiffs failed to plead

.

the existence
of any specific valid contract between plaintiffs and their clients, that defendants had
.
".

any knowledge of such undisclosed valid contract, that defendants intentionally procured the breach
of such contract, and how plaintiffs were thereby damaged. Plaintiffs' proposed claim forintentional
interference with,prospective economic advantage would also fail to state a cause of action as they
failed to properly plead that defendants employed "wrongful means" which includes "physical
violence, fraud or misrepresentation,
economic pressure."

civil suits and criminal prosecutions

and some degree of

(Guard Life Corp. v S Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 NY2d 183, 191
\.

[1980].)
Civil Rights Law SS 50 and 51
Plaintiffs asserted a fourth cause of action for violation of Ciyil Rights Law ~~ 50 and
51 also wnolly premised on the same facts underpinning the defamation claims.
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New York does not recognize a:common-law right to privacy. (Roberson v Rochester
.

J

Folding Box Co., 171 NY 538 [1902].) In order to provide a limited right to privacy, the Legislature
enacted the Civil Rights Law

SS

50 and 51 to protect the usage of a person's "name, portrait or

picture"for "advertising" or "trade" purposes without "written consent of such person." This statute
has been narrow construed to meetit~ limited objective to prohibit commercial appropriation of a
person's name and likeness. (Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135 [1985].) T~ese sections also

,

do not apply to reports of "newsworthy events or matters of public in~erest" otherwise known as the

.

newsworthy exception.

.

(Messenger v Gqmer + Jahr Print. & Pub!., 94 NY2d 436, 441 [2000].)

• r

To foster freedom of expression,. the meaning of "newsworthiness"
,

permit a wide and liberal interpretation.

has ,been broadly construed to

(Id.)

I
In this case, it is abundantly clear that coverage of a murder trial in the Deaner case
comes within the broadly construed newsworthy exception as

a report

of a newsworthy event or a

matter of public concern. Thus, plaintiffs' fourth cause of action fails to state a claim for a violation
of Civil Rights Law

SS

50 and 51..

New Claims:

Injurious Falsehood. Prima Facie Tort & Negligence'

Plaintiffs also seek leave to assert several new causes of action for injurio~s falSehood,
pri~a facie tort and negligence. With respect to injurious falsehood, plaintiffs' claims are duplicative
of their claims of defamation'which ha~e been found to fail to state a cause of action: The same holds
true for the both injurious falsehood and need not be repeated .
.While plaintiffs withdrew their new claim of negligence in open court on April 8,
2013, which was primarily premised on the rejected defamation theory, they would nonetheless be
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~nable to recover for negligence because the facts alleged are "inseparable

from the tort of

,

-

defamation, and as such, plaintiftI s] [are] relegated to any remedy that would have been availabl~ on
that basis." (Butler, 203 AD2d at 785; see also Amodei v New York State Chiropractic Assn.; 160
AD2d 279 [i st Dept 1990].) In other words, plaintiffs can not simply transpose the defamation claim
into a contriyed negligence claim. (Colon v c:..ityof Rochester, 307 AD2d 742 [4th Dept 2003],
lafallo v Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 299 AD2d 925, 925 [4th Dept 2002] ["a defamation cause
of action is not transformed into one for negligence merely by casting it as a negligence cause of
action"],)

In order to prove a cause of action for prima facie tort, plaintiffs must.demonstrate the
following elements:
(i)

the intentional infliction of harm;

"(ii)

which results in special damages;

(iii)

without excuse or justification; -and

(iv)

by an act or series of acts which would otherwise be lawful.

(Freihofer, 65 NY2d at 142-143.) The failure to allege special damages would require dismissal of
the claim. (Id.) This cause of action would also fail as a "catch-all alternative" for other unsupported
tort claims because it cannot be "a basis to sustain a pleading which otherwise fails to state a cause
. of action in conventional t~rt." (ld. at 143.)
Here, plaintiffs' claim of prima facie tort must fail because they cannot demonstrate
the first element of intentional infliction of harm which was inextricably intertwined with the
dismissed second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs also failed
to sufficiently plead special damages which is a critical elemeht of prima facie tort. Most importantly,
defendants have set forth a legally cognizable excuse and justification

such as the content of the

-28comments and reportSwere newsworthy and privileged pursuant to Civil Rights Law 9 74 as set forth
above.
Sanctions
Many defendants seek to impose sanctions on plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorney for
commencing this allegedly "frivolous" action and awarding defendants reasonable attorney's fees and
costs pursuant to CPLR 9 8303-a

and/or 22 NYCRR 9 130-1.1. Plaintiffs also seek to impose

sanctions against Marc J. Randazza, Esq. ("Randazza"), "for frivolous conduct undertaken to harass
and/or maliciously injure ,the plaintiff."
,

C;PLR 9 8303-a provides for an award of mandatory costs

and fees for making

"frivolous" claims. In order to meet this defiriition of frivolousness under this statute; a court must
find either that (I) the "claim ... was commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely to delay or
prolong, the resolution of the litigation or to harass or maliciously injure another';; or (2) "the claim
.'.. was commenced or continued in bad faith without any reasonable basis in'law or fact and could
not be supported by ,a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law."
CPLR 9 8303-a( c)(1),(ii).
Pursuantto 22 NYCRR 9130.1-1, a court, in its discretion, may also impose financial
sanctions upon any party who engages in frivolous conduct.

Conduct is frivolous if: (I) it is

completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension,
modification ,or reversal of existing law; (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay ?r prolong the
resolution of the litigation, or to 'harass or maliciously injure another; or (3) it asserts material factual
statements that arefalse.

(22 NYCRR 9130.1-1 (c](1-3].) In determining whether theeonduct was

frivolous, "the court shall consider, among other issues the circumstances under whicr th~ conduct

-29.took place, including the time available for investigating the legal or factual basis of the conduct, and
whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent or
should have been apparent, cir was brought to the attention of counselor the party." (22 NYCRR
~130.l-I[c][3].)
(

Defendants assert that plaintiffs commenced this action and continued this action in
,

I

.

bad faith. Moreover, defendants argue that plaintiffs knew or should have known that they did not
.have a good faith basis
in law or fact for any of the .original four causes of action and the proposed
.
.
three new claims. Plaintiffs contend that Randazza screamed expletives at Rakofsky and illegally
threatened to commence a "wiretapping civil suit"against

plaintiffs

former counsel, Richard
D.
.
/
.

Borzouye, Esq. ifhe opposed Randazza's motion to be admitted pro hac vice to practice law in this'
state.
Plaintiffs have several redeeming arguments to avoid sanctions. First, there was some
basis in fact for plaintiffs to argue that defendants did not fairly report Judge Jackson's comments as
to the causeofihe

mistrial. It Is uncontroverted that Rakofsky initially requested a mistrial due to a

. break-down of communications

between him and his client. The record is unclear as to whether

Judge Jackson .considered Rakofsky's request in isolation, or in conjunction. with later comments
concerning Rakofsky's trial performance, wI1,enJudge Jackson ultimately declared a mistrial. Second,
. plaintiffs partially acted in good faith in withdrawing the new claim of negligence. Third, there is a
fine legal line for interpretation of alleg~d actionable defamatory statements offact as opposed to nonactionable pure opinion statements.
some of the alleged def~atory

In this regard, plaintiffs made colorable legal arguments that

material included actionable statements of fact or "mixed opinion"

-30that may have been sufficient to survive the dismissal motions. Fourth, some.ofthe statements were
extremely offensive or unnecessarily derogatory.
There are also no grounds to impose sanctions on Randazza.
Randaiza's

Plaintiffs opposed

motionl3 for admission pro hac vice with essentially the same reasons as this instant
I

motion for sanctions. About two years ago by decision and order dated September 15, 20 11, the Hon.
Emily Jane Goodman, 1.S.C., granted 'Randazza's motion over plaintiffs'

objection.

While the

previous motion was different than the instant one, Justice Goodman necessarily found that
Randazza's conduct was acceptable to practice law in this state, and impliedly not sanctiqnable.
In any event, under these circumstances, no sanctions are warranted about two years later. .

Conclusion
, Bas~d on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED, that defendants' pre-answer motionS to dismiss under sequence numbers
002,004,005,006,007,008,009,010,014,015;

016, 017 and 018 are granted; and it is further

ORDERED, that defendants' motions under sequence numbers 007, 010,019 and 020,
pursuant CPLR

S

8303-a and/or 22 NYCRR

S

136-1.1, imposing sanctions on plaintiffs and

plaintiffs' attorney for commencing this allegedly "frivolous" action and awarding defendants
/

reasonable attorney's fees and costs are denied; and it is further
ORDERED, that plaintiffs' cross-motion pursuant to 22 NYCRR

S 130-1.1,

awarding.

sanctions against Marc 1. Randazza, Esq., "for frivolous conduct undertaken to harass and/or
maliciously injure the plaintiff," is denied; and it is further

13.

Motion Sequence Number 001.

-31ORDERED, that the branch of plaintiffs' cross-motion pursuant to CPLR

S 100 I (a),

adding WP Company LLC as a necessary party, is denied; and it is further
-'
.
ORDERED, that the branch of plaintiffs' cross-motion pursuant to CPLR

S 3025(b),

granting plaintiffs leave to serve and file a Second Amended Verified Complaint, is denied; and it
is further
ORDERED, that the branch of plaintiffs' cross-motion pursuantto CPLR

SS 3217 and

2101 (c), permitting plaintiffs to discontinue this action against eight defendants who have settled with
them and to delete their names from the caption, is denied without prejudice with leave to renew upon
plaintiffs either submitting stipulations of discontinuance or at least specifically stati~g the nam~s of
the eight settling defendants; and it is further
ORDERED, that the branch of plaintiffs' cross-motion pursuant to CPLR ~ 3215,
granting plaintiffs a default judgment against seven defendants on the issue ofliability and setting this
matter down for an inquest on the assessment of damages, is denied without' prejudice (and due
consideration if it is appropriate to seek this relief again based on the rulings herein) as plaintiffs
failed to both list the names of the defaulting defendants and to provide the requisite specificity to the
alleged defaulting defendants that plaintiffs were seeking default judgments against them.
Settle Order" within thirty (30) days of entry of this decision and order.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this Court.

Dated: New York, New York
April 29, 2013

{(A

~
,Hon. Shlomo S. ~agler, J.S.C.

14.
This Court respectfully requests that all moving defendants submit only one combined
notice (or cross-notice) of settlement to avoid duplication and preserve limited'judicial resources.
Plaintiffs may submit a separate notice (or cross-notice) of settlement.

